[The mind-brain problem (I): onto-epistemological foundations].
Throughout the history of thought, science and philosophy have addressed the problem of mind-brain from different epistemic perspectives. The first covers specific areas of reality and constructs hypotheses with limited scope and multiple inter-scientific connectivity with the aim of validating theoretical models; the second extends its systemic architecture to all that is real (including scientific activity). The complexity of the mind-brain problem requires the generation of a link connecting the disciplines of philosophy and science; our onto-epistemological presuppositions therefore fall within the framework of a scientifically-oriented philosophy (scientific philosophy). Emergentist materialism is defended as a coherent and verifiable philosophical-scientific solution, as opposed to other proposals developed on the basis of different ontological models (for example, interactionist dualism, functionalism, theory of identity, epiphenomenalism, and so on). An answer to the mind-brain problem is only feasible if based on a philosophically grounded cognitive neuroscience: emergentist materialism -an ontological postulate- holds that the mind is an emergent property (qualitative novelty) of the brain; scientific realism -an epistemological postulate- holds that cognitive neuroscience is the basic theoretical-experimental tool that allows cognitive access to both the brain and its neurocognitive processes. We consider that on the basis of this philosophical reasoning, cognitive neuroscience acquires epistemic legitimacy to be able to undertake the study of the most genuinely human mental process: consciousness.